Model checking is a very successful technique which has been applied in the design and verification of finite state concurrent reactive processes. In this paper we show how this technique can be used for the verification of security protocols using a logic of belief. The underlying idea is to treat separately the temporal evolution and the belief aspects of principals. In practice, things work as follows: when we consider the temporal evolution of a principal we treat belief atoms (namely, atomic formulae expressing belief) as atomic propositions. When we deal with the beliefs of a principal § , we model its beliefs about another principal¨as the fact that § has access to a representation of¨as a process. Then, any time it needs to verify the truth value of some belief atom about¨, e.g.,© , § simply tests whether, e.g., holds in its (appropriate) representation of¨. Beliefs are essentially used to control the "jumping" among processes. Our approach allows us to reuse the technology and tools developed in model checking.
Introduction
In this paper we show how model checking (see, e.g. [6, 11] ) can be used for the verification of security protocols using a logic of belief and time [2] . Our approach allows us to reuse with almost no variations all the technology and tools developed in model checking and it is on the line of the work by Fagin et al. [8] . We model principals participating to a protocol session as (concurrent reactive finite state) processes able to have beliefs. The specification of a principal has therefore two orthogonal aspects: a temporal aspect and a belief aspect. The key idea underlying our approach is to keep these two aspects separated. In practice things work as follows:
When we consider the temporal evolution of a principal we treat belief atoms (namely, atomic formulae expressing belief) as atomic propositions. The fact that these formulae talk about beliefs is not taken into consideration.
When we deal with the beliefs of a principal , we model its beliefs about another principal as the fact that has access to a representation of as a process. Then, any time it needs to verify the truth value of some belief atom about , e.g., , simply tests whether, e.g., holds in its (appropriate) representation of . Beliefs are essentially used to control the "jumping" among processes. This operation is iterated in the obvious way in case of nested beliefs.
Various papers can be found in literature, where belief logics have been applied to testing security in protocol verification (see for instance [4] ). However, in all the previous work (see, e.g., [4, 1] ) verification is performed proof-theoretically. The application of model checking to security protocol verification is not new (see. e.g., [10, 12] ). However, in the previous work, security protocols are verified by introducing the notion of intruder and, then, by verifying whether the intruder can attack a given protocol. This approach makes possible to directly find a trace of a possible attack but it may not be clear what the protocol flaw is. Furthermore, the finite presentation of intruder's knowledge makes this verification method incomplete. This work usually employs temporal logics or process algebras. Our approach is different, we do not use any model of intruders and our formalism is able to represent both time and belief. This work builds on the work described in [3] , where model checking is applied to BDI attitudes (namely, Belief, Desire, and Intention) of agents. The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the logic of belief and time we employ (called MATL, MultiAgent Temporal Logic). We also briefly introduce a well-known protocol, the CCITT X.509 protocol, as a running example. Section 3 introduces finite presentations of MATL (called MAFSM, MultiAgent Finite State Machines). Section 4 describes the model checking procedure we propose. Finally, some conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
A logic of belief and time
We model principals engaged in an authentication session as finite state processes. We build the notion of principal incrementally over the notion of process. Suppose we have a set of principals. Each principal is seen as a process having beliefs about (itself and) other principals. We adopt the usual syntax for beliefs:
" . We call any
, a view. Figure 1 depicts the general structure of the views. Each view in G F corresponds to a possible nesting of belief operators. We also allow for the empty string,
Q
. The intuition is that Q represents the view of an external observer (e.g., the designer) which, from the outside, "sees" the behavior of the overall protocol. The beliefs of principal correspond to the view 8 R and are modeled by a process playing 's role in a protocol. 
where the variables for the sent messages are labeled (in subscript) with both the sender and the intended receiver, while those of received messages are labeled only with the actual receiver. With respect to the other views, the additional subscripts for both B ) models the (beliefs about the) behavior of principal $ , the set of atomic proposition will be that of view ! (see [2] ). In MATL we can formalize how messages sent and received during a protocol session by a party may affect its beliefs about the other parties. For instance, one might want to express the following property: at the end of a protocol session, believes that recently "said" q and r . Formally: , where
is a set of chains,
, where
. Let us assume that the each interpretation satisfies the formula written close to it in figure. Therefore, the interpretation labeled Let us now define the notion of satisfiability. We start with satisfiability local to views (first step) and suppose that for each view I there is a satisfiability relation between CTL structures and formulae of T U
. With an abuse of notation, we denote all these satisfiability relations with the same symbol Õ %
. The context always makes clear which relation we mean. The second step is to define (global) satisfiability taking into account chains. To do this we need some further notation. Let 
. In other words, if a chain stops at a given level (e.g.
I
), then it satisfies every formula of the views (e.g., I Ú Ì ) which are below that level in the tree. Let us extend the satisfiability relation to sets of formulae:
if and only if for any
. We are now ready to define the notion of model for MATL (called MATL structure), and then that of satisfiability between MATL structures and formulae of a view.
Definition 2.1 (MATL structure) A nonempty compatibility relation

Í for a family of MATL languages on
is a MATL structure on
if for any
iff for every
, then for any state 3 Ï of´, there is a
Briefly: the nonemptyness condition for Í guarantees that the external observer has a consistent view of the world. The only if part in condition 1 guarantees that each view has correct beliefs, i.e., any time ! holds at a view then holds in the view one level down in the chain. The if part is the dual property and ensures the completeness of each view. Condition 2 can be understood on the basis of two crucial observations, concerning the mutual nesting of CTL operators and belief operators. The first, concerning the nesting of CTL operators inside belief operators is that
is computed using the notion of satisfiability in a CTL structure. Therefore, a chain links the fact that a belief atom holds in a state of a CTL structure in one view with the fact that its argument holds in a state of a CTL structure in the view below. The second observation concerns the nesting of belief operators inside temporal operators (temporal operators which involve no belief atoms are treated as in CTL structures, that is, without jumping among views). Consider for instance the formula EX ! Þ ²
. To assess the truth of EX ! Þ ² we need to be able to assess the truth of " ! 4 ² in some future (reachable) state Ï of the CTL structure we are considering, e.g.,
. The only way to establish this is to request that in Ï we have a chain AE Ï which gives access to a CTL structure in the view below. Given the fact that chains connect CTL structures only for what holds in their (reachable) states, the only solution is to request that Ï is the state component of the structure
. Given the fact that temporal operators allow us to state facts about all the states in a CTL structure, this operation must be repeated for each state there must be a chain starting from the interpretation in view Q whose component for view 8 R does not satisfy the argument of the belief, namely
. This is indeed the case for both , and it is defined as follows:
The intuition is that in order to check the satisfiability of at the view I we need to check all the interpretations of T U allowed by the compatibility imposed by the chains we are considering. For any set of labeled wffs
. 
Definition 2.2 (MATL Logical consequence)
I Ú Ê Å chain AE D Í , if for every Ì prefix of I , AE ¢ é ¬ Õ % × è é then AE U Õ % Ó .
A labeled formula is valid if it is a logical consequence of the empty set.
Notice that MATL structures define a logic where each ! has the same strength as a modal operator in the multimodal logic
, where´is the number of principals.
MultiAgent Finite State Machines
We are interested in extending CTL model checking to the model checking of belief formulae. In model checking, finite state processes are modeled as finite state machines. A finite state machine (FSM) is a finite CTL structure . This restriction is not enough, as a finite set of views still allows for an infinite number of belief atoms. Even if we had a finite number of processes we would not be able to model them as FSMs. This problem can be solved introducing the notion of explicit belief atoms as a finite subset of the set of belief atoms. Explicit belief atoms are the only belief atoms which are explicitly represented in a FSM, allowing for a finite set of states. As we explain below, the truth value of all the other belief atoms not explicitly represented in a FSM is computed starting from explicit beliefs. Formally, if . In this way, though, one can only model systems whose specifications must be expressed with an "a priori" bound on the nesting of belief operators. As a consequence, it would not be possible to deal with, e.g., (infinite) positive/negative introspection or an arbitrary nesting of belief operators. Moreover, each view must be specified separately even when different views of principals happen to behave in the same way. One way to overcome these limitations is to extend the finite tree of views to a graph of views. Cycles in the graph allow us to represent arbitrary nesting of beliefs and to model equivalent views using the same specification. is modeled by a process whose (possible) behaviors are those of as seen from 's point of view. Since protocols are usually supposed to be publicly known, and each honest principal's behavior is assumed to comply to the protocol, those two views in the CCITT protocol should exhibit the same set of behaviors. In other words, the two views are behaviorally equivalent. Therefore, both views can be modeled by the same process. Similar argument can be given for . Each view in
will be the first view, in a path of the tree of views, that do not belong to 7 . Formally
and
. Let ë be any functional relation included in
. . We can consider only three views in 7 , namely Q 0 ) R and .
Q
(the external observer) is modeled as a process which "sees" all the messages sent and received by the principals. R models the behavior of principal , while models the behavior of principal . In this case, we set
. The beliefs of ( , respectively) about 
is total recursive function such that:
for all views
, it associates a finite set í U of FSMs on the MATL language on the following atoms:
and, for all
for all the views
The first condition on í ensures that the protocol specification is not empty; the second allows us to deal, in each view, with finite sets of FSMs; and the third allows us to deal with a finite number of views. In general, there may be more than one FSM associated to each view. This allows for situations in which a view can be only partially specified, and consequently there can be more than one process modeling that view. If it is completely specified, a view contains only one FSM. in the following way: . In the rest of the paper we assume that each set of explicit belief atoms only contains belief atoms of depth one, i.e., atoms of the form ! , where does not contain other belief atoms. This is clearly a restriction in general, but it greatly simplifies the framework when cycles are allowed, while being sufficient for modeling most security protocols (see, e.g., the informal discussion in [2] ). Given the notion of MAFSM, the next step is to give a notion of satisfiability in a MAFSM. We start from the notion of satisfiability of CTL formulae in an FSM at a state (defined as in CTL structures). Since FSMs are built on the propositional and explicit belief atoms of a view, to assess satisfiability of the propositional and explicit belief atoms (and the CTL formulae build out of them) we do not need to use the machinery associated to belief operators. However, this machinery is needed in order to deal with the (infinite) number of belief atoms which are not memorized anywhere in MAFSM. Let the set of implicit belief atoms of a view
, be defined as the (infinite) subset of all belief atoms of T U which are not explicit belief atoms. Formally:
The idea is to use the information explicitly contained in the labeling function of each state of a FSM 
Thus, in Figure 4) , also satisfy the argument f of the implicit belief atom. If this is the case, then , the satisfiability relation
is defined as follows:
1. 
We have furthermore:
4.
In the definition of satisfiability above, Item 3 is the crucial step. 
The model checking algorithm
The basic operation of a standard CTL model checking algorithm is to extend the labeling function of an FSM (which considers only propositional atoms) to all the (atomic and not atomic) subformulae of the formula being model checked. Let us call Extended FSM (or, simply, FSM when the context makes clear what we mean) the result of this operation. The generation of an extended FSM relies on the fact that the labeling function explicitly defines the truth value of all atoms. The problem is that in the FSMs of a MAFSM the labeling function is not defined on implicit belief atoms, whose truth value is therefore left undefined; and that we need to know the truth values of the implicit belief atoms occurring in the formula to be model checked. The definition of satisfiability in a MAFSM (Item 3 in Definition 3.2) tells us how to solve this problem.
The crucial observation is that a MAFSM. The notion of compatibility relation just defined for a MAFSM is the dual notion of the compatibility relation defined in MATL. Then:
Starting from a view , and a state of a FSM of view
is a reachable state of . Hence, the following holds: to the equivalence classes induced by
Example 4.1 Figure 5 represents the underlying intuition on the MAFSM for the CCITT protocol. The relation that we want to model check. It calls the algorithm MAMC-View (shown in Figure 6 ) on view I and the set of formulae ' 9 . As a result, after this step, MAMC can return the appropriate truth value simply by testing whether is contained in the label set of the initial states . In this process, the algorithm recursively descends the tree structure which needs to be model checked. The leaves of this tree are the views for which there is no need to model check implicit belief atoms, as there are no more implicit belief atoms occuring in explicit and implicit belief atoms) occurring in the input formulae. Notice that in this phase we can employ any model checker (in our case NuSMV [5] ) as a black box.
The following result states that MAMC-View actually solves the model checking problem for MATL. This result extends a similar result proved in the case of trees of views and reported in [3] . The termination of MAMCÅ View is guaranteed by the fact that input formulae always have beliefs of finite depth.
Conclusions
In this paper we have described a model-checking based verification procedure for security protocols employing a logic of belief. Our approach allows us to reuse the technology and tools developed in model checking. To model beliefs in security protocols, we have defined MATL -MultiAgent Temporal Logic -a logic where the temporal aspect and the belief aspect are kept separated. This semantics is the basis for introducing the notion of MultiAgent Finite State Machine (MAFSM) as an extension of the usual notion of Finite State Machine. Then, we have described a model checking algorithm (MAMC) which allows us to verify formulae containing belief (sub)formulae in a MAFSM.
A semantics for MATL was originally proposed in [3] for MultiAgent systems. The version proposed in the present paper extends the work in [3] and makes it applicable to security protocols. It is inspired by the semantics proposed in [9] , extended to deal with the temporal dimension. [2] describes in some detail how a security protocol (the Andrew protocol) can be modeled and model checked using the logic defined in [3] . The analyses in [2] has some limitations due to the limited expressibility of the logic defined in [3] .
